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Does a region in U.S. have different consumption behaviors for the various types of OJ 
(Orange Juice)?  Major types of OJ are FCOJ (Frozen Concentrated OJ), NFC 
(refrigerated Not Form Concentrated OJ), and Recon (refrigerated Recon OJ). The four 
regions, Northeast, West, South and North Central, show different prices and 
consumption patterns by OJ types. The region denotes East as Northeast and North as 
North Central on this paper. The West has the highest NFC price and the lowest FCOJ 
price; the East has the lowest price of NFC and Recon. The difference of NFC price 
between East and West is $0.80/gal. The East and South regions consume almost 40% 
and 30% of total NFC and West respectively and North regions consume approximately 
40% and 28% of total FCOJ. In South and North, Recon has been consumed 40% and 
27% of total.  
AIDS (Almost Ideal Demand System) of Deaton and Muellbauer and Rotterdam are 
frequently used demand specifications. Those two are easy to imposed and test of 
theoretical restrictions and useful to estimate without relying on nonlinear estimating 
procedures. Barnett compared both demand models using Monte Carlo techniques and 
concluded that both models perform well when substitution among goods is low, but the 
Rotterdam model appears better to recover the true elasticities, when we implement exact 
aggregation within weakly separable branches of utility tree. The AIDS model often 
classifies substitutes as complements or overestimates the elasticities of substitution 
among goods within weakly separable branches of the utility tree. By following the 
results of Barnett, the Rotterdam demand model is used to estimate OJ demand. 
Brown and Lee and Duffy studied the impacts of advertising using the Rotterdam 3 
 
model. Duffy used the expenditure for advertising while Brown and Lee used the 
coverage, indicating percentages of grocery store sales on all commodities where print 
media and display ads were present by using %ACV (percent All Commodities Volume). 
In this study also, %ACV was used to estimate the impacts of two different types of 
advertising.  
Seemingly Unrelated regression (SUR) is employed to estimate this demand system. 
To use SUR model, I assume that the price is predetermined. One of the equations is 
eliminated to satisfy the adding–up restriction. When the demand system is estimated, the 
linear homogeneity and symmetry restrictions are imposed. In addition, I assume that the 
demand for OJ is satisfied weak separability of the utility tree.  
For the further step of the estimation, the simulation using parameters estimated shows 
the change of the OJ demand by different levels of prices and advertising.  
 
The Rotterdam Model with Advertising variables 
A system of OJ demand equations is estimated using the absolute price version of the 
Rotterdam model:  
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Equation (1) is the demand equation of the absolute version of the Rotterdam Model 
with an average budget share,  ) ( 52 , , 2
1
− + = t i t i it ω ω ϖ . The demand model (1) is estimated 



















ij π , and symmetric  ji ij π π = . Imposing advertising variables in a demand system, 
only adding up restriction involves the impact of advertising must be offset by demand 
decreases for other products to satisfy the budget condition as a result of demand increase 
for some products. 
This system can be estimated with one equation deleted after adding Engel aggregation 
















ij e e η ω − = . The 









 In order to check the restriction on symmetry and the negative semi-definiteness, the 
Slutsky matrix may be checked at the point of approximation. Since we imposed the 
linear homogeneity, the rank of Slutsky matrix is n-1. In case of Rotterdam model, the 
Slutsky matrix is [ ] ij π .  
Simulating of demand system is a efficient way to answer demand changes for 
different types of OJ within a region and for a particular type of OJ across regions at a 
given level of budget. To use the models for simulation purpose, the Rotterdam model is 
transposed from the differentiated log terms to the differentiated terms based on the 5 
 
average values of the expenditures, prices, and quantities. The range of variation is from 
60% to 140% of the average value of prices and ads. At the first simulation, the changed 
demands come from only the price change at a given levels of ads. The second part of 
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 Where m is an expectation of the total expenditure;  i p  is a price expectation for the ith 
commodity;  j q  is a quantity expectation for the jth commodity.  
 
Data 
The data used in the paper comes from Nielsen from 9/11/2004 to 6/2/2007 by week. The 
number of total observations is 143 per region. Supermarkets with annual sales of at least 
$2 million were used.  
To be considered fruit juice demand, the model includes not only three types of OJ but 
also grape fruit juice (GJ), orange juice blended (OJ BL), and orange juice drink (OJ Dr) 
which have great proportions in fruit juice consumption. The expenditure share of OJ Dr 
dominated more than FCOJ in US.  
The percentages of ACV (All commodity Volume), the total dollar sales for the stores, 
were measured for the two major different types of ads; print media (A and B type ads on 
newspapers) and displays in stores. Print media A and B ads are considered major ads on 
BFD ad, store flyers, etc: type ‘A’ ads are the most prominent (generally have a picture) 
and type ‘B’ ads are secondary in size. Displays include special effort to sell and in a 6 
 
secondary location of the store etc. For example, a 90% ACV for NFC’s print media ad in 
East means that 90% of ACV comes from the print media ad for enhancing NFC sales 
during that period in the East region. Twelve ad variables by types of OJ were included in 
each demand equation.  
In the West and North regions, the %ACV of print media and display ads for FCOJ is 
greater than total U.S. For NFC, the %ACV of print media ads is greater than total U.S in 
the East region and the %ACV of display ads is greater than total U.S. in the East and 
North. For Recon, the West region has greater the %ACV of print media ads and the 
North region has greater the %ACV display ads than total U.S. (Table 1) 
Prices differ among four regions and by OJ types. Usually, the average price of NFC is 
the highest as $5.68/gal, the price of Recon is $4.15/gal, and the price of FCOJ is the 
$3.70/gal for sample periods. However, in the East region, the price of FCOJ is $4.00/gal 
which is greater than the price of Recon $3.83/gal. The price gap among OJ types is 
$2.62/gal between NFC and FCOJ and $1.15/gal between Recon and FCOJ in the West. 
The East region has the smallest price gap by OJ types. The price gap is $1.60/gal 
between NFC and Recon. The East region and West have higher price than U.S average 
for FCOJ and Recon respectively. (Table 1) 
About 63% of FCOJ was consumed in the West and North and 67% of NFC was 
consumed in the East and South regions. The South region consumed about 37% of 
Recon and the North region consumed 28% of Recon. The consumption of OJ was over 
52% as NFC, 39% as Recon and 9% as FCOJ in overall U.S. (Table 1) 
  The patterns of expenditure share show more likely the consumption of FCOJ in the 7 
 
West and North, NFC in the East and South and Recon in the South. The West and North 
regions have over 60% of expenditure share for FCOJ and the East and South regions 
have 65% of expenditure share for NFC. These regions have lower or similar price levels 
of U.S. Even though the average price of Recon is greater than the U.S in the West 
region, the expenditure share of Recon is similar to the North region. (Table 1) 
The consumption of Recon is greater than NFC in the region of the West and North for 
the total sample period. The consumption proportion of NFC is overwhelming 76% 
compare to other types of OJ in the East region. In the South region, the consumption of 
Recon is greater than the NFC in 2005 but the consumption of NFC turned upside done in 
2006. Both the West and North regions, even though the consumption proportion of 
Recon is still the greatest the portion decreased in 2006. The consumption proportion of 
NFC increased in 2006 for the both regions.  
By following the studies of Brown, season of the year effect for juice demand was 
corrected using 52
nd differences (the number of weeks in a year being 52) in transforming 
the data as required for the Rotterdam model (
2005 2006 log log log t t t q q q d − = ). 
 
Table 1. Basic statistics by region – 9/11/2004 though 6/2/2007 
Weekly Average  Region / US 
   US East South  West  North East  South  West  North 
   Price ($/gal.)  Price Ratio (%) 
FCOJ 3.698  4.004  3.747 3.612  3.627  1.083  1.013 0.977  0.981 
NFC 5.685  5.426 5.750  6.226  5.622  0.954  1.012  1.095  0.989 
Recon 4.149  3.826  3.946  4.764  4.046  0.922 0.951  1.148  0.975 
GJ 6.350  6.798  6.006  6.861  6.080  1.071  0.946  1.080  0.957 
OJ BL  5.192  5.467  5.058  5.439  4.878  1.053  0.974  1.048  0.940 
OJ Dr  3.158  3.597  2.837  3.640  3.168  1.139  0.898  1.152  1.003 
   Quantity (1000 SSE gallons)  Quantity Share (%) 
FCOJ 989  127  240 315  307 0.129  0.243  0.319 0.310 
NFC 5950  2117 1829  958  1043 0.356  0.307  0.161 0.175 
Recon 4512  526  1669  1062  1253  0.117  0.370 0.235  0.278 
GJ 343 73  142  66 61  0.214  0.415  0.192  0.179 8 
 
OJ BL  525  103  166  141  115  0.196  0.317  0.269  0.219 
OJ Dr  1476  273  669  217  316  0.185  0.453  0.147  0.214 
   Expenditure (1000 dollars)  Expenditure Share (%) 
FCOJ 3,617  504  893 1,122  1,098  0.139  0.247 0.310  0.303 
NFC 33,610  11,390 10,458  5,933  5,821  0.339 0.311  0.177  0.173 
Recon 18,425  1,983  6,463  4,993  4,987 0.108  0.351  0.271 0.271 
GJ 2,155  493 846  448  370  0.229  0.392  0.208  0.171 
OJ BL  2,729  561  843  766  560  0.206  0.309  0.281  0.205 
OJ Dr  4,640  977  1,898  767  997  0.211  0.409  0.165  0.215 
  Print media Ad (%)  Print media Ad Share (%) 
FCOJ 16  13  10 21  23  0.818  0.608  1.330  1.451 
NFC 73  90 69  70  64  1.240  0.950  0.967  0.887 
Recon 54  40  51  69  57  0.735  0.942  1.281  1.044 
GJ 11  12  11  10  13  1.072  0.965  0.852  1.146 
OJ BL  23  30  19  25  23  1.268  0.807  1.075  0.975 
OJ Dr  21  35  18  19  17  1.621  0.840  0.903  0.773 
  In store Display Ad (%)  In store Display Ad Share (%) 
FCOJ 3  1  2 4  5  0.362  0.563  1.488  1.679 
NFC 24  28 22  19  31  1.155  0.890  0.759  1.278 
Recon 20  11  17  19  33  0.560  0.850  0.984  1.668 
GJ 3  4  3  2  4  1.189  0.883  0.590  1.351 
OJ BL  5  5  4  4  9  0.918  0.718  0.741  1.811 




Results of estimated models are in Table A1 though Table A5 at the appendix. Most of 
the parameters are significant and the Slutsky coefficients satisfy negative semi-
definition.  
 Table 2 shows expenditure and own price elasticity. All of the expenditure elasticities 
are positive and significant. Thus, fruit juices are normal goods with respect to fruit juice 
expenditure. For three types of OJ, expenditure elasticities of U.S are all less than one 
which means that the consumption of OJ will be increased less than 1% by increasing 1% 
of expenditure whereas expenditure elasticities for NFC in the East region, Recon in the 
West region and FCOJ and NFC in the North region have greater than one. Expenditure 
elasticities of FCOJ in the West region and of Recon in East region are extremely small 
compared to other regions (Figure 1). 9 
 
 All of the own price elasticities have negative signs and significantly different from 
zero. For compensated elasticities, the elasticity of FCOJ is the smallest among three 
types of OJ in US. When the own price increases, FCOJ consumption will be decreased 
smaller amounts compared to NFC and Recon. In the East region, even though the price 
of NFC increases more than 1%, the consumption will be decreased less than 0.5%. Four 
regions have elasticities less than one for FCOJ and greater than one for Recon for own 
compensated elasticities.  
By increasing OJ price, OJ consumption will decrease by more than the relative price 
increases since all price elasticities are greater than one except for FCOJ in the East and 
South regions. For uncompensated price elasticity which includes the income 
(expenditure) elasticity, Recon has high price elasticity compare to FCOJ and NFC which 
means that when the price goes up, the consumption of Recon will be decreased 
proportionally more. If the price of Recon increases by 1%, then the quantity of Recon 
will be decreased by 1.872% in the East region and 1.571% in the West region.  
The price elasticity for FCOJ is a slighter greater than the results of Ward and less than 
the result of Thilley(1980). Ward(1976)’s estimate showed that FCOJ elasticity was -
0.5228 on a quarterly basis. The retail price elasticities for FCOJ were estimated to be -
1.33 on a monthly basis.  
Most elasticities of the print media and display ads have positive signs. The advertising 
enhances demands. Even though some of responses have negative signs, they are not 
statistically significant. The impact of ad is not big for the demand of that good but the 
magnitudes of elasticity do not indicate that the advertising is ineffective. The 10 
 
insignificant elasticities indicate that the advertising does not affect demand in selected 
regions and orange juices type. Print media ads affect the demand of three types of OJ in 
the North region and display ads in the West region and have significant effects on all 
three types of OJ. In the East region, both print media and display ads significantly affect 
the demand for Recon.  
Variations of own price and ad elasticities are shown in figure 1. FCOJ in the North 
region and Recon in the East region are located far from the others although the range for 
three types of OJ are not very different among regions; 0.433 for FCOJ, 0.421 for NFC, 
and 0.476 for Recon. Elasticities of print media and display ads for FCOJ have small 
distribution; its range is 0.028 for print media ads and 0.026 for display ads while 
elasticties of Recon have large distribution whose range is 0.205 for print media ads and 
0.168 for display ads.   
Comparing the elasticity change between the beginning and the ending weeks of 
sample periods, most of region increased the expenditure and uncompensated elasticities 
for FCOJ and Recon but decreased for NFC except for the East region (Table 3). Only in 
the East region, uncompensated elasticity of NFC was slightly increased from 1.199 to 
1.226. Elasticities of print media and display ads for FCOJ were slightly increased in 
U.S., West and North. For NFC, both print media and display ads were not changed in 
most regions but elasticity of print media ads in the North region was decreased from 
0.077 to 0.068. For Recon, elasticities for two different types of advertising were slightly 
increased in most regions except for the East region in which elasticities of print media 





Table 2. Expenditure and own price elasticity by region – 9/11/2004 through 6/2/2007 







































































Recon  (0.079) (0.179)  (0.083) (0.071) (0.081) 
0.029




FCOJ  (0.009) (0.011)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) 
0.031
* 0.022  0.004 0.005  0.083
** 





Print media Ad  
Elasticity 
Recon  (0.02) (0.046)  (0.02) (0.013)  (0.023) 
0.056




FCOJ  (0.01) (0.02) (0.015)  (0.006)  (0.009) 
-0.010 0.016  0.004 0.049
* -0.003 
NFC  (0.017) (0.017)  (0.015) (0.026) (0.019) 
0.059
** 0.183
** 0.022  0.078
** 0.015 
In store Display 
Ad  
Elasticity 
Recon  (0.023) (0.063)  (0.027) (0.019) (0.017) 
*(**) Statistically different form zero at α=0.1(0.05) 
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
 
 
























Print media  
elasticity 
Display 
elasticity  Region 
OJ 
Types  
Begin End Begin End Begin End  Begin  End Begin End 
FCOJ -0.712  -0.780 0.816  0.894  -0.762  -0.830  0.025 0.028 0.049 0.054 
NFC -0.882  -0.862  0.999  0.977  -1.397 -1.377  0.030  0.030 -0.010 -0.009  US 
Recon -1.231  -1.341  0.794 0.865  -1.456  -1.566  0.011 0.013 0.058 0.063 
FCOJ -0.839  -0.849 0.899  0.910  -0.868 -0.878  0.003  0.003  0.011  0.011 
NFC -0.437  -0.465  1.031  1.095  -1.199  -1.226  0.027 0.028 0.018 0.019  East 
Recon -2.148  -1.626  0.612 0.464  -2.212  -1.690  0.161 0.122 0.120 0.091 
FCOJ -0.793  -0.827 0.831  0.867  -0.833  -0.867  0.009 0.009 0.021 0.022 
NFC -1.048  -1.001  1.016  0.970  -1.536  -1.489  0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003  South 
Recon -1.085  -1.238  0.858 0.979  -1.354  -1.506  0.043 0.049 0.018 0.020 
FCOJ -0.866  -1.002 0.607  0.702  -0.919  -1.056  0.022 0.026 0.045 0.052 
NFC -0.987  -0.903  0.980  0.896  -1.389  -1.304  0.005 0.005 0.038 0.035  West 
Recon -1.166  -1.353  0.983 1.140  -1.529 -1.715  -0.026 -0.030  0.073  0.085 
FCOJ -1.084  -1.242 0.956  1.095  -1.170  -1.328  0.039 0.045 0.027 0.031 
NFC -1.233  -1.092  1.158  1.025  -1.696 -1.554  0.077  0.068 -0.003 -0.003  North 
Recon -1.196  -1.391  0.810 0.942  -1.499  -1.694  0.085 0.099 0.024 0.028 
 
Simulations of demand changes 
Most of the simulation results on figures are based on the changes of quantity or dollar 
sales a range from 60% to 140% of average levels of prices, print media ad and in store 
display ad.  
The prices decrease from 140% to 60% levels of the average price increase OJ 
demand. Consumptions of NFC increase 6,621 thousand gallons and Recon increase 
5,193 thousand gallons in U.S. Demand responses are similar for the East and South 
regions and the West and North regions. In the East and South, the quantity changes of 
NFC are over 2,000 thousand gallons compared to the West and North. The quantity 
change of Recon is the greatest in the South in which the price elasticity is relatively in-
elastic but the consumption of Recon is about 40%. Price cutting does not impact on 14 
 
enhancing dollar sales of FCOJ for the most of regions except for the North. The dollar 
sale of NFC is higher than Recon in North but the quantity change of Recon is greater 
than NFC because NFC has more elastic price. Decreasing price returns more sales for 
FCOJ in the North, Recon in the West and NFC (Figure 2)  
Visualized advertising has more effect on stimulating consumers to purchase FCOJ in 
U.S. The effect of display ad is double of print media for FCOJ. Display in store 
increases the consumption of Recon 206 thousand gallons a week by ad range from 60% 
to 140% of average. Whereas print media spurs increasing demand 143 thousand gallons 
a week. The display for NFC and print media for Recon do not statistically significant.  
Figures from 4 to 6 show the average weekly gains in dollar sales and dollar sales per 
media unit across regions by media range ± 40% of the average level by types. For 
FCOJ, display in store more impacts on increasing demand in the South and West while 
print media increases demand in North. The effect of display unit is absolutely greater 
than print media.  
Most of the ad effects on demand of NFC are not statistically significant. Display in 
store enhances the demand of NFC in West and print media stimulates the demand of 
NFC to increase in the North. The effect of display unit is 12 thousand dollars in the West 
and the effect of print media unit is 7 thousand dollars.  
The display in store impacts on increasing Recon demand in the East and the West and 
the print media affects increasing demand in the East, South and North. In the East, the 
change of dollar sales is 159 thousand dollars from the display in store and 214 thousand 
dollars from the print media.  15 
 
Display in store has generally more effects on increasing demand than print media in 
most of regions and types of OJ but the print media has strong effects to enhancing 








Figure 3. Impact of Ads on FCOJ in US 
 
 
Figure 4. Impact of Ads on FCOJ across regions 17 
 
Figure 5. Impact of Ads on NFC across regions 
 
Figure 6. Impact of Ads on Recon across regions 18 
 
 
Figure 7. Average gains in dollar sales per media unit 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
The Rotterdam model with an advertising specification was used to estimate the 
different consumption patterns of various types of OJ by U.S region. The four regions 
are: East, South, West, and North. The study examined the demand relationship among 
three types of pure OJ (FCOJ, NFC, and Recon), three other fruit juice (GJ, OJ BL, and 
OJ drinks). Juice demand seasonality was corrected by 52
nd differencing of weekly using 
scan track data provided by Nielsen for the periods from 9/11/2004 through 6/2/2007.  
Results show that the three different types of OJ are normal goods and they are all 
substitute in the four regions. It has high own price elasticities since there exists various 
substitutes. When the price increased, NFC and Recon consumption will be decreased 19 
 
more than the amount of price increase because most of the own price elasticity are 
greater than 1. Uncompensated elasticity for NFC is more price elastic than FCOJ with 
having income effect. Elasticities of advertising gave positive impacts for OJ demand. 
Especially, both types of ad highly affect the demand for Recon in East region. Print 
media and display ad significantly affect the OJ demand in the North and West regions 
respectively. The different types of advertising, print media and display, have been 
affected in the same direction of demand changes as a results of comparing to the 
elasticities between a beginning and ending points.   
OJ demand will be increased from 249 gallons to 10,895 gallons by 10% increase 
advertising. Demand effect from two types of advertisings indicates various by types and 
regions. Display ads have more impact on FCOJ demand increase in the West and South 
regions and print ads have more impact on FCOJ demand increase in the North region, 
Recon demand increase in the East region. Advertising effect between print media and 
display ads may depend on the degree of marketing or sale strategy.  
For the orange juice industry it is clear that the effects of in-store compared with print 
media shows substantial differences between the two advertising media as well as by 
product form and among regions.  From these estimates considerable gains can be 
realized through a more micro-designed marketing strategy, focusing on both the product 
category and regions.  This draft of the paper shows the differences, recognizing that 
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Table A1. Estimated results of US 
  Marginal Share  Slutsky Coefficients  Print media ad Coefficients  Display ad Coefficients 
  i µ  
1 i π  
2 i π  
3 i π  
4 i π 5 i π 6 i π  
1 i γ  
2 i γ  
3 i γ  
4 i γ  
5 i γ  
6 i γ  
1 i τ  
2 i τ  
3 i τ  
4 i τ  
5 i τ  
6 i τ  
0.050
**  -0.044
**  0.007 0.032
** -0.011
** 0.018
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*(**) Statistically different form zero at α=0.1(0.05) 






Table A2. Estimated results of East 
  Marginal Share  Slutsky Coefficients  Print media ad Coefficients  Display ad Coefficients 22 
 
  i µ  
1 i π  
2 i π  
3 i π  
4 i π 5 i π 6 i π  
1 i γ  
2 i γ  
3 i γ  
4 i γ  
5 i γ  
6 i γ  
1 i τ  
2 i τ  
3 i τ  
4 i τ  
5 i τ  




** 0.002  -0.006




























































**     -0.224























































































































*(**) Statistically different form zero at α=0.1(0.05) 






Table A3. Estimated results of South 
  Marginal Share  Slutsky Coefficients  Print media ad Coefficients  Display ad Coefficients 
  i µ  
1 i π  
2 i π  
3 i π  
4 i π 5 i π 6 i π 1 i γ  
2 i γ  
3 i γ  
4 i γ  
5 i γ  
6 i γ  
1 i τ  
2 i τ  
3 i τ  
4 i τ  
5 i τ  






































































**     -0.339
**  0.017


















































































































*(**) Statistically different form zero at α=0.1(0.05) 






Table A4. Estimated results of West 
  Marginal Share  Slutsky Coefficients  Print media ad Coefficients  Display ad Coefficients 
  i µ  
1 i π  
2 i π  
3 i π  
4 i π 5 i π 6 i π  
1 i γ  
2 i γ  
3 i γ  
4 i γ  
5 i γ  
6 i γ  
1 i τ  
2 i τ  
3 i τ  
4 i τ  
5 i τ  
6 i τ  
0.053
**  -0.076
**  0.003 0.032
** 0.003  0.032






















































































































































































*(**) Statistically different form zero at α=0.1(0.05) 






Table A5. Estimated results of North 
  Marginal Share  Slutsky Coefficients  Print media ad Coefficients  Display ad Coefficients 
  i µ  
1 i π  
2 i π  
3 i π  
4 i π 5 i π 6 i π  
1 i γ  
2 i γ  
3 i γ  
4 i γ  
5 i γ  
6 i γ  
1 i τ  
2 i τ  
3 i τ  
4 i τ  
5 i τ  




























































































































































































*(**) Statistically different form zero at α=0.1(0.05) 






Table A6. Elasticities of US 
  Expenditure  Compensated price elasticity  Uncompensated price elasticity  Print media ad elasticity  Display ad elasticity 
  i η   C
i e 1   C
i e 2   C
i e 3   C
i e 4   C
i e 5   C
i e 6   U
i e 1   U
i e 2   U
i e 3   U
i e 4   U
i e 5   U
i e 6   A
i e 1   A
i e 2   A
i e 3   A
i e 4   A
i e 5   A
i e 6   D
i e 1   D
i e 2   D
i e 3   D
i e 4   D
i e 5   D
i e 6  
0.907
**  -0.792


















(0.08)  (0.129) (0.138) (0.13) (0.059)  (0.086) (0.058) (0.129) (0.132) (0.128) (0.06) (0.088) (0.059) (0.009) (0.039) (0.025) (0.006) (0.01) (0.017) (0.01) (0.037) (0.03) (0.008) (0.014) (0.037)
0.999








** 0.012 0.018 0.170
** -0.007 0.031
*  -0.004 0.008
** 0.003 0.007 -0.013
** -0.010 -0.047
** 0.003 0.003 0.006 NFC 











** -0.030 0.003 -0.082
**  0.012 -0.012
** -0.002 -0.013 0.041
** -0.028 0.059
** -0.002 -0.012 -0.108
**
Recon 









** 0.022 -0.024 -1.313
** 0.302
** 0.099 0.009 -0.030 0.003 0.016

















** -0.056 0.002 -0.012 -0.024 -0.011 0.008 -0.012 0.037
** 0.061 0.085
** 0.008 0.052
** -0.064 OJ BL 
(0.113) (0.114)  (0.2)  (0.147)  (0.079)  (0.157) (0.076) (0.114) (0.179) (0.15) (0.08) (0.16) (0.076) (0.011) (0.047) (0.03) (0.007) (0.012) (0.02) (0.013) (0.044) (0.035) (0.01) (0.017) (0.045)
OJ Dr 
1.794






** 0.029 -0.070 -2.013
** 0.009 0.251
** -0.019 -0.014 -0.023 -0.034 -0.141





(0.155)  (0.044) (0.175)  (0.15)  (0.029) (0.044) (0.139) (0.043) (0.181) (0.145) (0.03) (0.045) (0.144) (0.021) (0.09) (0.059) (0.014) (0.022) (0.04) (0.023) (0.084) (0.07) (0.018) (0.032) (0.082)
*(**) Statistically different form zero at α=0.1(0.05) 






Table A7. Elasticities of North East 
  Expenditure  Compensated price elasticity  Uncompensated price elasticity  Print media ad elasticity  Display ad elasticity 
  i η   C
i e 1   C
i e 2   C
i e 3   C
i e 4   C
i e 5   C
i e 6   U
i e 1   U
i e 2   U
i e 3   U
i e 4   U
i e 5   U
i e 6   A
i e 1   A
i e 2   A
i e 3   A
i e 4   A
i e 5   A
i e 6   D
i e 1   D
i e 2   D
i e 3   D
i e 4   D
i e 5   D





** 0.115 0.116  -0.897
** 0.106 -0.052 -0.226
















** -0.003 -0.005 0.022  -0.030
** 0.003 -0.002 -0.011
* 0.004 0.016 -0.025
** 0.000 -0.003 -0.021
*
NFC 
(0.025) (0.007)  (0.037) (0.031) (0.005) (0.007) (0.017) (0.007) (0.041) (0.031) (0.005) (0.007) (0.017) (0.003) (0.027) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.017) (0.011) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011)
0.516
** 0.016  1.450
** -1.808




** 0.008 0.037 0.231
** 0.011 -0.160  0.184
** -0.002 0.007 0.087
** -0.010 -0.076 0.183
** 0.000 -0.009 -0.091 Recon 








** -0.085 -0.051 -1.407
** 0.173
** 0.421
** -0.009 0.072 -0.015 0.009 -0.009 -0.011 0.002 -0.009 0.034 0.008 0.017 0.038 GJ 
(0.079)  (0.071) (0.121) (0.099) (0.071) (0.071) (0.099) (0.072) (0.117) (0.096) (0.072) (0.071) (0.1) (0.009) (0.074)  (0.023) (0.006) (0.009) (0.018) (0.016) (0.045) (0.03) (0.006) (0.012) (0.035)
1.336
















(0.094) (0.076)  (0.146)  (0.111)  (0.062)  (0.106) (0.118) (0.076) (0.139) (0.107) (0.063) (0.107) (0.12) (0.01) (0.086) (0.027) (0.007) (0.011) (0.022) (0.019) (0.053) (0.035) (0.007) (0.014) (0.04)
0.986










** -0.014 -0.018 -0.033






(0.14)  (0.062)  (0.19)  (0.153) (0.049) (0.066) (0.187) (0.061) (0.194) (0.149) (0.049) (0.067) (0.191) (0.016) (0.134) (0.042) (0.01) (0.017) (0.033) (0.03) (0.084) (0.055) (0.011) (0.021) (0.057)
*(**) Statistically different form zero at α=0.1(0.05) 







Table A8. Elasticities of South 
  Expenditure  Compensated price elasticity  Uncompensated price elasticity  Print media ad elasticity  Display ad elasticity 
  i η   C
i e 1   C
i e 2   C
i e 3   C
i e 4   C
i e 5   C
i e 6   U
i e 1   U
i e 2   U
i e 3   U
i e 4   U
i e 5   U
i e 6   A
i e 1   A
i e 2   A
i e 3   A
i e 4   A
i e 5   A
i e 6   D
i e 1   D
i e 2   D
i e 3   D
i e 4   D
i e 5   D


































** 0.001 0.004  -0.011 0.000 0.007
* -0.009 -0.003 0.004 -0.011 0.006
* 0.011 0.024 NFC 






** 0.008 -0.010 0.039
** 0.561
** -1.396
** 0.021 -0.027 -0.090 0.001 0.022  0.047
** -0.008
* -0.010 0.012 0.046
** -0.090
** 0.022 0.010 0.001 -0.136
**
Recon 




































** -0.053 OJ BL 








** 0.003 -0.050 -1.302







(0.286)  (0.045) (0.177) (0.206) (0.042) (0.048) (0.2)  (0.044) (0.219) (0.17) (0.042) (0.052) (0.218) (0.023) (0.068) (0.051) (0.013) (0.022) (0.039) (0.035) (0.084) (0.07) (0.018) (0.037) (0.08)
*(**) Statistically different form zero at α=0.1(0.05) 







Table A9. Elasticities of West 
  Expenditure  Compensated price elasticity  Uncompensated price elasticity  Print media ad elasticity  Display ad elasticity 
  i η   C
i e 1   C
i e 2   C
i e 3   C
i e 4   C
i e 5   C
i e 6   U
i e 1   U
i e 2   U
i e 3   U
i e 4   U
i e 5   U
i e 6   A
i e 1   A
i e 2   A
i e 3   A
i e 4   A
i e 5   A
i e 6   D
i e 1   D
i e 2   D
i e 3   D
i e 4   D
i e 5   D
i e 6  
0.668
**  -0.953
**  0.034 0.397
** 0.039 0.409
** 0.074 -1.006
** -0.248 0.159 0.018 0.373
** 0.037 0.019
** -0.085
* 0.023 0.008 0.006 0.014 0.034
** -0.001 -0.068
* -0.004 0.007 -0.146
**
FCOJ 
(0.124)  (0.13)  (0.163) (0.139) (0.052) (0.068) (0.052) (0.132) (0.162) (0.135) (0.053) (0.07) (0.053) (0.009) (0.049) (0.027) (0.007) (0.01) (0.018) (0.006) (0.057) (0.041) (0.01) (0.018) (0.042)
0.949









** -0.006 0.005  0.005 0.007




























(0.056) (0.031)  (0.075)  (0.073) (0.013) (0.02) (0.02) (0.032) (0.079) (0.071) (0.014) (0.021) (0.021) (0.004) (0.023) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.027) (0.019) (0.004) (0.009) (0.02)
1.453









** 0.000 0.030 0.039 0.007 0.001 0.014 0.015















** -0.057 -0.010 -0.088






(0.12)  (0.101) (0.156) (0.132) (0.058) (0.105) (0.047) (0.103) (0.151) (0.127) (0.059) (0.108) (0.048) (0.008) (0.044) (0.024) (0.006) (0.01) (0.016) (0.006) (0.05) (0.036) (0.008) (0.016) (0.038)
1.872










* -0.018 0.023 -0.023
**-0.142
** -0.024 -0.007 -0.009 0.369
**
OJ Dr 
(0.144)  (0.074) (0.148) (0.128) (0.029) (0.045) (0.071) (0.075) (0.157) (0.132) (0.029) (0.047) (0.072) (0.011) (0.061) (0.034) (0.009) (0.012) (0.023) (0.008) (0.072) (0.05) (0.012) (0.022) (0.053)
*(**) Statistically different form zero at α=0.1(0.05) 







Table A10. Elasticities of North 
  Expenditure  Compensated price elasticity  Uncompensated price elasticity  Print media ad elasticity  Display ad elasticity 
  i η   C
i e 1   C
i e 2   C
i e 3   C
i e 4   C
i e 5   C
i e 6   U
i e 1   U
i e 2   U
i e 3   U
i e 4   U
i e 5   U
i e 6   A
i e 1   A
i e 2   A
i e 3   A
i e 4   A
i e 5   A
i e 6   D
i e 1   D
i e 2   D
i e 3   D
i e 4   D
i e 5   D






** 0.053 0.004 -1.330
** 0.137 0.436
** -0.271
** 0.008 -0.077 0.032
**-0.121
** 0.040 -0.006 0.010 0.028 0.019























** -0.005 0.012 NFC 












** 0.029 0.001 -0.085
** 0.085
** -0.001 -0.003 -0.027
* 0.016















** -0.008 -0.035 -0.055
* 0.006 -0.008 -0.015 0.013 0.101
** 0.093
** 0.028
** 0.013 0.028 GJ 
(0.095) (0.145)  (0.159)  (0.135)  (0.093) (0.101) (0.102) (0.144) (0.159) (0.129) (0.094) (0.102) (0.105) (0.011) (0.042) (0.032) (0.008) (0.01) (0.022) (0.011) (0.036) (0.025) (0.008) (0.012) (0.043)
0.914















** 0.061 OJ BL 
(0.098)  (0.144) (0.159) (0.134) (0.067) (0.144) (0.106) (0.143) (0.158) (0.128) (0.067) (0.145) (0.108) (0.01) (0.042) (0.032) (0.008) (0.01) (0.022) (0.011) (0.036) (0.025) (0.007) (0.011) (0.042)
1.020

















(0.162)  (0.09)  (0.178) (0.193) (0.037) (0.058) (0.168) (0.087) (0.194) (0.177) (0.038) (0.058) (0.175) (0.019) (0.075) (0.057) (0.015) (0.017) (0.04) (0.018) (0.064) (0.044) (0.012) (0.019) (0.068)
*(**) Statistically different form zero at α=0.1(0.05) 
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
 
 